Joint perception: gaze and social context by Richardson, Daniel C. et al.
University of Huddersfield Repository
Richardson, Daniel C., Street, Chris N. H., Tan, Joanne Y. M., Kirkham, Natasha Z., Hoover, 
Merrit A. and Ghane Cavanaugh, Arezou
Joint perception: gaze and social context
Original Citation
Richardson, Daniel C., Street, Chris N. H., Tan, Joanne Y. M., Kirkham, Natasha Z., Hoover, 
Merrit A. and Ghane Cavanaugh, Arezou (2012) Joint perception: gaze and social context. Frontiers 
in Human Neuroscience, 6. ISSN 1662-5161 
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/25725/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
Joint perception:
Gaze and social context
Daniel C. Richardson *
Chris N.H. Street
Joanne Y.M. Tan
Cognitive, Perceptual & Brain sciences
University College London
Natasha Z. Kirkham
Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development, 
Birkbeck, University of London
Merrit A. Hoover
School of Medicine
Oregon Health and Science University
Arezou Ghane Cavanaugh
Department of Psychology
University of California, Riverside
WORD COUNT:  5926
Keywords: vision; joint action; eye movements; 
social cognition, situated cognition
* Corresponding Author
 Daniel C. Richardson
 dcr@eyethink.org
 Cognitive, Perceptual & Brain sciences
 University College London
 Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK
Abstract
We found that the way people looked at images was influenced by their belief 
that others were looking too. If participants believed that an unseen other 
person was also looking at what they could see, it  shifted the balance of their 
gaze between negative and positive images. The direction of this shift 
depended upon whether participants thought that later they would be compared 
against the other person or would be collaborating with them. Changes in the 
social context influenced both gaze and memory  processes, and were not due 
just to participants’ belief that they are looking at the same images, but also to 
the belief that they are doing the same task. We believe that this new 
phenomenon of joint perception reveals the pervasive and subtle effect of 
social context upon cognitive and perceptual processes.
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Introduction
What is the difference between experiencing something by  yourself and experiencing it at the same time 
as another person? When a student hovers over your shoulder while you read their paper, does it 
influence your evaluation? When someone sits down on the sofa while you are watching TV, does their 
presence intrude upon your experience of the show? What if you are watching a show alone, but know 
that a friend across town is also tuned in? In this paper, we investigate the phenomenon of joint 
perception: the changes that happen when people believe that they  are experiencing something at  the 
same time as another person. To isolate these effects from the demands of social interaction, we made 
the difference between perceiving something alone and jointly as small as possible. We presented 
images to participants, tracked their gaze, and manipulated - on a trial by  trial basis - whether or not they 
believed that an unseen other person was looking at the same sets of images. 
Social context, the real or imagined presence of other people (Allport, 1954), is a ubiquitous 
psychological force. Cognition is enveloped by  social context (Smith & Conrey, 2009; Smith & Semin, 
2004). Yet the effects of social context upon cognition often fall between the cracks of social and 
cognitive psychology. In cognitive and perceptual laboratories, we typically place participants in an 
experimental quarantine, away from the confounds of social influence. As a consequence, we have many 
elegant demonstrations of the different behavioral and neurological responses to social versus non-social 
stimuli (e.g., Birmingham, Bischof & Kingstone, 2008; Cacioppo, Visser & Pickett, 2005; Senju & 
Johnson, 2009; Wu & Kirkham, 2010), but little idea of how these and other stimuli are processed in a 
social versus a non-social context. 
In contrast, a founding principle of social psychology  is that the processes and representations of 
individuals are related to the groups around them (e.g., Asch, 1951; Festinger, 1950; Heider, 1958; 
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Sherif, 1935). For example, in the theories of Gestalt  psychologists such as Lewin (1947), behaviour 
was determined, moment by moment, by a field that incorporated both an individual’s goals, intentions 
and desires, and the goals and intentions of those around them. Indeed, one of the very first experiments 
in social psychology showed that people performed better in presence of others (Triplett, 1898), and 
later work expanded this effect of social facilitation to a range of contexts, and even other species 
(Zajonc, 1965; Zajonc, Heingartner, & Herman, 1969). Recent work has revealed specific influences that 
the race of the experimenter (Lowery, Hardin & Sinclair, 2001) or the gender of a partner (Most, 
Laurenceau, Graber, Belcher, & Smith, 2010) can have on a participants’ behaviour and social 
judgments. When people interact, they are motivated to form a ‘shared reality’ (Hardin & Higgins, 
1996): a speaker will adapt the content of their message to align with the beliefs of their audience, and 
consequently come to believe that message themselves (reviewed by Echterhoff, Higgins & Levine 
2009). Beliefs and judgments are not formed in cognitive isolation, but always in the context of the 
thoughts and opinions of those around us (Smith & Semin, 2007). Our goal was to take these lessons 
from social psychology, and apply  them to a simple perceptual process that was either done alone, or in 
the belief that it was being done with another. 
In a precursor to these studies, Fridlund (1991) showed clips of a comedy show to participants. If they 
were sitting next to a friend they smiled significantly more than when watching alone, as measured by 
EMG levels in their facial muscles.  Importantly, exactly the same increase in smiling was found if they 
were alone but told that their friend was also watching the show in a room next door. This surprising 
finding showed that smiling cannot be entirely due to self presentation and top down control of 
expressions, as it occurs in solitude; but neither can it be simply a response to the stimulus, as it is 
changed by beliefs about social context.  Recently, Shteynberg (2010) found intriguing evidence that 
social context can influence the ‘psychological prominence’ of stimuli: When participants were told that 
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other people like them were performing the same experimental tasks with the same stimuli, their 
memory and decision-making performance improved. 
In the current experiments we explored the effects of social context through the lens of joint perception. 
Rather than an overt social behaviour, such as smiling, we used eye tracking as an index of online 
cognitive processing (Spivey, Richardson, Dale, 2008).  Rather than comparing participants in different 
social contexts, we determined sensitivity to social context by  varying participants beliefs about each 
other on a trial-by-trial basis. 
To pre-empt our results, a surprising reversal of the joint perception effect between the first two 
experiments uncovered an interesting interaction between social context and participants’ expectations, 
tasks and beliefs. These results connect the phenomenon of joint perception to recent work on joint 
action (Galantucci & Sebanz, 2009), the cognitive mechanisms at work when people act together 
(Brennan, Chen, Dickinson, Neider, & Zelinsky, 2008; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006), and the 
notion of cognition situated in a social context  (Barsalou, Breazeal & Smith, 2007; Robbins & Aydede, 
2009).
Experiment 1
Our initial exploration of joint perception presented participants with a set of four images on screen for 
eight seconds. On different trials, participants either believed that, in a cubicle next door, another 
participant was looking at the same images, or that the person next door was looking at a set of unrelated 
symbols (Figure 1). In each set of images, there was one picture with a negative valence (e.g., crying 
child), one with a positive valence (e.g., a smiling couple) and two neutral images with no strong 
valence (e.g., a person reading). Work such as Shteynberg (2010) has established that people will be 
attuned to stimuli that an experimenter identifies as shared: the fact that someone else is looking at a 
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stimulus increases its salience. By  presenting a set of four pictures at once, we can address an 
importantly different issue. How does the fact that  a whole set of images is shared or seen alone change 
which images are salient and which are not? In other words, how does social context shape attention?
Figure 1.   Trial schematic
You will be looking 
at pictures, your 
partner will be 
looking at symbols
You will both 
looking at the 
same pictures 
Pairs of participants were told what they 
and their partners would see, and then 
looked at either images or symbols for 8s 
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Methods
Participants 
Twenty-seven undergraduates from the University of California, Santa Cruz took part in the experiment 
in exchange for course credit. We did not collect data from 6 due to failures to calibrate. Although we 
ran pairs of participants in the lab, each participants’ data were analysed independently  as they  could not 
see each other or interact. Therefore, twenty-one participants’ data were analysed.
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Apparatus  
Participants sat in adjacent cubicles in a reclining chair looking up  at  an arm mounted 19” LCD screen 
approximately 60cm away. A custom built  remote eye tracker was mounted at the base of each display. 
The participants wore a headset, through which they could hear the stimuli and speak to the 
experimenter. Two iMacs calculated gaze position for each participant approximately 100 times a 
second, presented stimuli and recorded fixation position parsed into regions of interest. The 
experimenter’s computer saved an audio-video record of what  the participants saw, heard and said 
during the experiment, superimposed with their gaze positions. 
Design 
32 trials were presented in a random order. Figure 1 provides a schematic. At the start of each trial a 
prerecorded voice and text message informed participants about the type of images they were about to 
see, and what their partner would see. Half the time participants saw a set of four pictures, and half the 
time they saw a set of four symbols. Counterbalanced with the image type, participants were either 
(truthfully) told that their partner would be looking at the or a different image type. In each set of four 
pictures there were two neutral images, one positive and one negative image. The pictures in this 
experiment were collected according to the subjective opinion of the experimenters (a normed stimuli 
set was used in subsequent experiments). The symbol sets, which served only as filler items in this 
design, were taken at random from a set of geometric patterns found in various font sets. The images 
were displayed onscreen for 8s. Following a blank screen for 1s, the next trial began.
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Figure 2. Time course of gaze probabilities, Experiment 1
Results and Discussion
Figure 2 shows the time course of the probabilities of the positive and negative images being fixated 
during the 8s of the trial. People are generally very responsive to unpleasant or threatening things: 
Negative images are considered more potent than equivalently-valenced positive images (for reviews, 
see Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2004). Negative stimuli are likely to receive attention 
more quickly (Norris et  al., 2004; Smith et al., 2003) and for longer (Hajcak & Olvet, 2008). This effect 
can be seen in our data in an initial spike in looks to the negative images in the first few seconds of the 
trials in both conditions. After that point however, the looking patterns diverge.
Our hypothesis simply concerns whether there is an effect of social context that is specific to positive 
verses negative images in the course of a trial. We had no a priori expectation that the effect would 
emerge with a particular time signature. Therefore, to test for differences between conditions, we 
calculated the total looking times to the positive and negative images, as shown in Figure 3 (a). We 
found that when participants believed that they  were looking alone, they looked more at  the negative 
stimuli (Tukey’s HSD p<.05). Conversely, they  looked more equally at the positive and negative stimuli 
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when they thought their partner could see the same thing. A 2 (picture valence: negative or positive) x 2 
(social context: joint or alone) ANOVA revealed a significant interaction (F(1,20)=5.52, p<.05, hp2=.21), 
with no main effects (all Fs <1), indicating that beliefs about the social context  modulated how viewers 
distributed their gaze to positive and negative images.
Participants in this experiment could not see or interact with each other. Yet their gaze was 
systematically  shifted if they  believed that another person was looking at the same images. When two 
people are instructed to perform a visual task together, their gaze patterns reveal that they are able to 
divide their attention with ease, searching the non-overlapping areas with efficiency (Brennan et al, 
2008). In our experiments, participants were not instructed to perform a task with each other or 
coordinate their activity: they  simply  viewed pictures by themselves with the belief that someone else is 
doing the same thing, or not. It was not simply  that shared images received greater attention 
(Shteynberg, 2010). Indeed, in this paradigm there was no main effect on looking times overall. More 
specifically we found here that when set images were believed to be shared, the distribution of 
participants’ attention shifted. This initial result demonstrates how social context can shape a low level 
perceptual process on a trial-by-trial basis.
Experiment 2
We sought to replicate the joint perception effect using an expanded and normed stimuli set. A weakness 
of our first experiment was that the images were categorised according to experimenters’ intuition. The 
categories were divergent enough that it was deemed extremely unlikely, for example, that what one 
person would call an unpleasant image, another would call pleasant. However, in order to draw 
conclusions about responses to negative and positive images, we used the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS), a set of photographs that have been extensively normed on a range of attributes (Lang, 
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Bradley & Cuthbert, 2005). Whereas the initial experiment took place in California, Santa Cruz, this 
study was carried out at a new laboratory in London, UK.
Methods
The experiment was identical to Experiment 1 apart from the following details.
Participants 
20 undergraduates from University College London took part  in the experiment in exchange for course 
credit. We did not collect data from 2 due to equipment problems and failures to calibrate. 
Apparatus  
Rather than adjacent cubicles, the participants sat in opposite corners of a 5m² room. They could not see 
each other or each other’s displays.
Design 
There were 64 trials presented in a random order, but the structure and randomisations remained the 
same as Experiment 1. The four pictures in each trial were randomly  chosen from normed sets created 
using Lang et al’s (2005) valence ratings. There were two neutral images (valence from 4.8 to 5.2, mean 
5), one positive (7.6 to 8.3, mean 8), and one negative (1.6 to 2.4, mean 2).
Results
For the trials in which the participants saw pictures, we calculated the total looking times to the positive 
and negative images. These times were different when participants were looking alone versus jointly, as 
shown in Figure 3 (b). A 2 (picture valence: negative or positive) x 2 (social context: joint or alone) 
ANOVA showed a significant interaction (F(1,17)=9.96, p=.006, hp2=.37), and a significant difference 
between valence conditions only in the joint condition (Tukey’s HSD, p<.01). When they believed that 
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their partner was looking at the same stimuli, participants looked more at the negative images. There 
was no significant difference when they  believed they were looking alone. There was a main effect of 
picture valence (F(1,17)=5.24, p=.04) but not of social context alone (F <1). 
We compared Experiments 1 and 2 directly. A 2 (valence) x 2 (social context) x 2 (experiment) ANOVA 
found a significant three way interaction (F(1,37)=9.061, p=.005, hp2=.20), but no other significant 
interactions or main effects. The interaction between valence and social context was significantly 
changed between the two experiments. In other words, the preference for negative pictures when 
viewing alone, in Experiment 1, reversed to a preference for negative pictures when viewing jointly, in 
Experiment 2.  
Discussion
Once more, we found an effect of joint perception: when participants believed that  another person was 
looking at a set of images at the same time as them, it influenced how they looked at a set  of images. To 
our surprise, however, the direction of this influence was different in this experiment. As a comparison 
of Figure 3 (a) and (b) shows, whereas the participants in Experiment 1 looked more at the negative 
images when alone, participants in Experiment 2 looked more at the negative images when looking 
jointly with each other. 
There were several differences between the US and UK laboratories, both in terms of their physical 
arrangement and their participant populations. Which of these caused a reversal in the direction of the 
joint perception effect? We decided to focus on one source of indeterminacy in the paradigm: the way in 
which participants construed the situation. A valid criticism of the experiments so far is that participants 
were not given reasons for looking at the images, or told why the person next door was sometimes doing 
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the same thing. We reasoned that participants could make very different assumptions about whether, for 
example, they might be evaluated against the other person, or whether they  might be interacting with the 
other person later. It  is conceivable that different construals could be reached by participants in the 
different labs, and that these could influence participants differently in the joint perception conditions. 
We tested this line of reasoning by giving participants explicit task instructions in our next experiment, 
and assessing their influence on the direction of the joint perception effect. 
Experiment 3
The experiment was the same as Experiment 2, with the same population of UK participants, but they 
were told either that we would be comparing their picture preferences (comparison task), or that they 
would be collaborating with each other on a memory task (collaboration task). 
Methods
The experiment was identical to Experiment 2 apart from the following details.
Participants 
24 undergraduates from University College London took part  in the experiment in exchange for course 
credit. We did not collect data from 4 due to failures to calibrate.
Design
Participants were randomly  assigned to either the compare or the collaborate condition. After the 
calibration screen, but before the trials began, participants read an instruction screen informing them that 
sometimes they  would be looking at the same things as their partner, sometimes different things. In the 
compare condition it  stated that we were interested in comparing “your preferences for different  pictures 
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and symbols with your partner's”. In the collaborate condition, participants were told the focus was on, 
“how well you and your partner can remember the pictures and symbols together”. 
Results
The task that participants were assigned influenced the direction of the interaction between social 
context and picture valence, as shown in the lower half of Figure 2. These differences are supported by  a 
significant three way interaction between task, social context and valence (F(1,18)=8.49, p=.009, hp2=.
32). People who were told that  they were collaborating looked more at the negative images in the joint 
condition (Tukey’s HSD, p<.01), like the UK participants who did not get task instructions in 
Experiment 2. In contrast, people who were told they were being compared to each other tended to look 
at the negative pictures more when alone (Tukey’s HSD, p<.01), like the US participants in Experiment 
1. There was a main effect of valence (F(1,18)=8.45, p=.009), but no other main effects or interactions 
were significant.
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Figure 3. Results from (a) Experiment 1, (b) Experiment 2 (c) and 
(d) the two conditions of Experiment 3
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Discussion
There could be many reasons, of course, for the reversal of results between Experiments 1 and 2. The 
stimuli, the lab configuration and the participants were all slightly different. But the results of this 
experiment show that one plausible reason is that  in the absence of instructions, the participants 
interpreted the task in different ways. We can only speculate why the participants in Experiment 1 might 
have felt that they were being compared to each other, or how the physical setup of the lab in the UK 
(one big room rather than adjacent cubicles) engendered a feeling of collaboration. Regardless, these 
results have established two key  points: that in all cases, participants reliably keep track of their 
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moment-by-moment social context, and that how they respond to changes in their social context is 
shaped by precisely how they construe their situation.
Our discussion so far has not touched upon one question: why is it that the effect of joint  perception is 
sometimes to increase looks to the negative pictures, and sometimes to the positive images? It seems 
plausible that participants who thought that their viewing preferences were being compared to each other 
might want to look equally at the positive and negative images, since they may feel that ogling a 
disturbing image might not reflect well upon them. However, why is it that in the collaborative task 
participants looking together tend to look at the negative images?   
When people collaborate in groups, they tend to align with the group  emotion (Barsade, 1998; Hatfield, 
Cacioppo & Rapson, 1993; Wageman, 1995). When communicating with each other, they  tune their 
messages and align them with the perceived group view (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). Perhaps then the 
minimal social context in our experiments is enough to turn on these processes of alignment, and 
magnify the individual’s disposition to attend to negative stimuli. At present these remarks remain 
speculative, as our focus here is not on explaining the directionality of joint perception effects, but on 
the conditions that allow social context to influence perception.
Experiment 4
So far, we have only  demonstrated that eye movements are influenced by beliefs about social context. 
One could argue, however, that eye movements are only indicative of lower level perceptual processing, 
that, in cognitive terms, they are epiphenomenal. Although there are theoretical and empirical arguments 
against this view (Spivey, et al., 2008), we wanted to investigate in this case whether the gaze 
differences produced by  social context could be detected by a measure of cognitive performance: 
recognition memory. In this version of the paradigm, eye movement measures are not taken but, 
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following presentation blocks, participants’ memory for the images is tested. We hypothesized that 
social context would determine which pictures attracted the most attention, and that this perceptual 
difference would lead to differing memory performance. 
Methods
The experiment was identical to Experiment 2 apart from the following details.
Participants 
36 undergraduates from University College London took part  in the experiment in exchange for course 
credit. We did not use data from 8 because, at debriefing, the participants indicated some awareness of 
our hypotheses. 
Design
Participants were run simultaneously in separate cubicles of a computer lab. At the start of the 
experiment, an instruction screen told them that they would be collaborating with a partner on a memory 
task, and that the computer had randomly paired them with another participant in the group. They saw a 
fake text message from the other participant greeting them, and were invited to respond with a short 
message. In fact, the participants were not paired with anyone and had no interaction with each other.
There were two identical blocks. In the presentation phase of each, participants saw 8 trials that were 
identical to those shown in Experiment 1: half were picture presentations, and half were symbols. On 
half the trials participants were told that they were looking the same images as their partners, and on the 
other half that they  were looking at  different images. Following that, there were 32 test trials, which 
consisted of a single picture presented until the participants made a yes or no response to indicate 
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whether they had seen it before. On half the occasions, the picture had been previously presented and 
was either one of the negative or one of the positive images. 
Results
The dependent variable was the speed of the correct responses to pictures that had been seen previously. 
Accuracy was 85% and did not differ between experimental conditions. A 2 (valence) x 2 (social 
context) ANOVA found a significant interaction (F(1,27)=6.98, p=.014, hp2=.21). In the joint  looking 
condition, the negative images (M=758ms, SD=114) were recognised faster than the positive 
(M=794ms, SD=120). Conversely, in the alone condition, positive images (M=785ms, SD=113) were 
recognised faster than the negative (M=828ms, SD=155). There was a main effect of social context 
(F(1,27)=8.01, p=.009), but not of valence (F<1). 
Discussion
Looking at something together does not merely  affect  eye movements. The images that received more 
visual attention in previous experiments, according to their valence and the social context, were also 
remembered more efficiently in this study. This result echoes Shteynberg (2010) ﬁnding that when 
participants believe other people are processing at the same stimuli as they are, those images become 
more ‘psychologically prominent’. But again, here we see that participants are selecting for themselves 
which images in each set become more prominent when they are believed to be shared. In our next 
experiment, we examine whether these effects are produced when just the stimulus is shared between 
people, or whether they must also be carrying out the same process as each other. 
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Experiment 5
What does it  mean to say that  people are looking at something ‘together’? There are at least two ways to 
understand that notion, which previously  we have treated as a unitary construct. For the joint perception 
effect to occur, is it  enough for participants to experience a set of images at the same time as each other? 
Or do participants have to believe that  they are engaged in the same task as the other person? In the 
current experiment, unlike those described above, the participants always believed that they  were 
looking at  the same images as each other. They also believed that they  were collaborating with their 
partner. What changed, trial-by-trial, was the task that they were doing, and the task that they believed 
their partner was doing. Inspired by the seminal work on joint action (Sebanz et al., 2006) that we 
discuss below, we predicted that joint  perception effects would be strongest when participants believed 
that they were not just passively sharing an experience, but acting jointly. 
Methods
The experiment was identical to Experiment 2, apart from the details below.
Participants
32 University College London students participated for course credit. Data from 4 participants were 
unusable due to equipment calibration problems.
Design
The instruction screen defined two tasks for the participants. In a memory  task, they  had to remember 
the pictures for a later test. In the search task, they had to look for a translucent X superimposed on one 
image, and press the mouse button that they  held in one hand if they detected it. They were informed 
that their task could change from trial to trial, and their partner’s task would change from trial to trial, 
but that their partner would always be looking at the same pictures as them.
18
At the start of each trial, participants were told their task for the upcoming presentation. A large icon at 
the top of the screen represented the task (visual search or memory), and a smaller icon below showed 
their partner’s task (shown in Figure 5). They also heard a voice say “You will be [memorising/
searching]. Your partner will be [memorising/searching]”.
There were 40 trials. In half the participant was told that they were to memorize the stimuli and in half 
they  were told that they were searching for an X. Counterbalanced, they were told that their partner 
performed the same task half the time, and a different  task the other half. On eight trials (spread evenly 
across conditions), an X appeared at a random location on one of the images. 
Results
Participants looked more towards the negative images when they  believed that their partner was doing 
the same task as them, regardless of what the task was. We calculated the total amount of time spent 
looking at the critical negative and positive images on trials where there was not an X present (we did 
not analyse the 20% of trials when there was an X present, as X and participants’ responses to it would 
interfere with how they allocated their attention to each image).  A 2 (valence) x 2 (own task: memory/
search) x 2 (other’s task: same/different) ANOVA was performed, and the means for each cell are 
displayed in Figure 4. There was a significant two way  interaction between valence and other’s task 
(F(1,27)=10.08, p=.004). Post hoc tests show that the difference between positive and negative images 
was significant when the participants believed they  were doing the same task (Tukey’s HSD p=0.01), 
but did not  reach significance when they were doing a different task.  There was also a main effect of 
valence (F(1,27)=19.19, p<.0001), but all other main effects and interactions were non significant (all Fs 
<1).
19
to
ta
l 
lo
o
k
in
g
 t
im
e
 (
m
s
)
1000#
1200#
1400#
1600#
1800#
2000#
2200#
2400#
nega,ve#
posi,ve#
same                   different               different                  same
Partner’s task
Own task
search                                          memory
Figure 4.  Looking times showed a significant interaction between valence and 
whether or not the participant’s partner was believed to be doing the 
same or a different task 
Discussion
The effects of joint  perception do not occur simply  when someone believes that another person is 
experiencing the same stimuli. It  is necessary to believe that the other, unseen person is engaged in the 
same task as themselves. This task could be to memorise the pictures, which presumably would require 
processing the meaning of an image, or the task could just be to search for a visual feature, which 
requires only superficial processing. Regardless, the effect of joint perception arises whenever these 
tasks are believed to be done together. In each case, the effect of this co-engagement is to fixate the 
negative images more than the positive. Previous research has shown that  when a stimulus is believed to 
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be shared, it  will be processed more deeply (Shteynberg, 2010). This result shows that both the stimulus 
and the cognitive process form part of the social context and modulate perception.
General Discussion
Social context  exerts a pervasive effect on perception. Even when the difference between looking alone 
and looking jointly is as small as possible, distinct behavioral and cognitive effects emerge. This 
conclusion has connections to work on language as a joint activity (Clark, 1996) and studies of 
behavioural coordination (Shockley, Richardson & Dale, 2009) and joint action (Galantucci & Sebanz, 
2009).
Language is remarkably ambiguous. ‘Please take a chair’, could refer to a variety  of actions with a 
variety of chairs in a room. Conversations do not grind to halt, however, because people are very good at 
resolving ambiguous references by drawing on knowledge about the context and assumptions that they 
have in common (Schelling, 1960). For example, when presented with a page full of items, such as 
watches from a catalogue, participants agreed with each other which one was most likely  to be referred 
to as ‘the watch’ (Clark, Schreuder & Buttrick, 1983). 
When we enter into any  conversation, such coordination is all important (Clark, 1996). When we talk, 
we implicitly agree upon names for novel objects (Clark & Brennan, 1991), align our spatial reference 
frames (Schober, 1993), use each others’ syntactic structures (Branigan, Pickering & Cleland, 2000), 
sway our bodies in synchrony (Shockley, Santana & Fowler, 2003; Condon & Ogston, 1971) and even 
scratch our noses together (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). When we are talking and looking at the same 
images, we also coordinate our gaze patterns with each other (Richardson & Dale, 2005), taking into 
account the knowledge (Richardson, Dale & Kirkham, 2007) and the visual context (Richardson, Dale & 
Tomlinson, 2009) that we share. In short, language engenders a rich, multileveled coordination between 
21
speakers. Perhaps in our experiments, the instruction stating that images were being viewed together was 
enough to turn on some of these mechanisms of coordination, even in the absence of any actual 
communication between participants.
Recently, researchers have argued that the characteristics of language, as a joint activity, can be found 
more widely in other forms of cooperative behavior (Sebanz, Knoblich & Bekkering, 2006). Studies of 
situated cognition (Barsalou, Breazeal & Smith, 2007; Robbins & Aydede, 2009) show that cognition ‘in 
the wild’ is intimately  linked not only to representations of the external world, but also to the cognitive 
processes of others. For example, Hutchins (1995) observed the ways that navy navigators distribute 
cognitive processes between themselves by using external tools and representations, such as maps and 
notations. Experimental methods are starting to reveal the sensitivity we have to mental states of those 
around us (Crosby, Monin & Richardson, 2008) and the mechanisms involved in acting jointly  (Sebanz 
et al., 2006). 
Social context can modulate even the simplest of tasks. For example, in a traditional stimulus-response 
compatibility task, participants make a judgment about one stimulus property (color) and ignore another 
stimulus property (location). If there is an incompatibility between the irrelevant property and the 
response (e.g. the stimulus is on an opposite side of the screen to the response button) then reaction 
times increase (Simon, 1969). Sebanz, Knoblich & Prinz (2003) divided such a task between two 
people. The participants sat next to each other, and each person responded to one color: in effect, each 
acting as one of the fingers of a participant in Simon’s (1969) experiment. Though each person had only 
one response to execute, they showed an incompatibility effect when acting together. There was no 
incompatibility effect when performing the same single response task alone. When acting jointly, 
participants represented their partners’ actions as if they were their own. 
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Joint action effects do not  occur if the participant is simply sat next to another person (Tsai et al., 2006), 
or if that person’s button pressing actions are not intentional (their finger is moved by  a mechanical 
device). Also, if the participant is acting jointly, but with a computer program (Tsai et al., 2008) or a 
marionette’s wooden hand (Tsai & Brass, 2007) there is not a stimulus-response incompatibility effect. 
Therefore, participants only form representations of another when that  person’s genuine, intentional 
actions are engaged in the same task. Our results fill out this picture. We have shown that  a  participant’s 
perceptual process is changed when they believe that another person is co-acting with them: they do not 
have to see the person (c.f. Tsai et al., 2008), and the ‘actions’ do not have to be overt behavior. If the 
participant thinks that the other person is memorising or scanning the images with the same intention, 
then that mutual cognitive process will shape their gaze patterns.
In finding an effect  of a minimal social context on behavior, our experiments echo a point that social 
psychologists have made from the outset. However, in only looking at a minimal social context, our 
experiments have ignored the findings of social psychology  from that point onwards. That is to say, we 
have not yet examined how perception might be influenced by a rich social context: how joint 
perception is modulated by  the individuals’ view of themselves and what they think of the other person, 
how their the motivations and goals might change the way they coordinate, and how differences between 
people may produce differences in cooperative behaviour. For example, tantalising results in our 
ongoing work suggest that there is a significant difference in how participants from individualistic and 
collectivist cultures perform in this paradigm (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Future work will investigate 
these differences, and explore how processes of social cognition feed in the the joint perception effect.
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Conclusion
We have known from the founding of social psychology that the presence and actions of others can have 
a powerful effect on an individual’s motivations, goals and judgments (Allport 1954). Our results have 
shown for the first time that even a minimal social context  - the sparse belief that an unseen other person 
is sharing an experience - exerts an influence over cognitive and perceptual processes. This finding 
provides support for the Gestalt notion that it is not simply  the viewer and the stimulus properties that 
determines attention, but a wider context, or field, that includes the presence of others around them 
(Lewin, 1947). The pervasive effects of social context have theoretical implications for how we view 
cognition (Robbins & Ayded, 2008), and raise an unexamined question about how we consume media 
and communicate.
The relationship  between our experiences and those of others is changing. For example, thirty  years ago 
in the UK, the Christmas special edition of the Morecambe and Wise TV show was seen, 
simultaneously, by 29 million people. 50% of the entire population shared the experience. Now, with 
many more channels, and the advent of recorded content, only  18% watched the most popular TV show 
last Christmas. Conversely, technology has turned traditionally solitary activities into shared 
experiences. Rather than putting a letter in the post and waiting for a colleague’s reply, first email then 
instant messaging, texting and now video conferencing have brought collaborators closer together in 
time and (virtual) space. Our results indicate that these changes in the commonality of experiences may 
have a deep cognitive significance. Although these studies have only  begun to unravel the mechanisms 
at work, the mere belief that someone else shares your perceptual experience appears to shape and direct 
that experience.
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